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Many societies have limited corruption through the broad-based mobilization of a diverse 
range of interests willing and able to defend themselves by making meaningful demands 
for accountability of, and limits upon, official power, and for an end to illicit advantages 
enjoyed by others. Historically such a process has taken place gradually, as political 
development has proceeded and the base of participation broadens. But today's high-
corruption societies cannot wait for several generations to see such developments take 
place. We argue that social action coalitions, linking public and private actors, are a way 
to mobilize these sorts of participation and advocacy. Such coalitions are neither a new 
idea nor a guarantee of successful reforms; indeed, in many instances they win out by 
default as an anti-corruption strategy. But we contend that if sustained by  careful 
planning and a diverse set of incentives, they can reinforce political will and enhance the 
strength of civil society. Coalition-building efforts are underway in many societies. But 
too often they have focused only on anti-corruption tactics and pursuing their own 
growth, rather than looking at the coalition-building process in more general terms. We 
do this, in Part I, by employing Wilson's (1973) analysis of the incentives that motivate 
and reward participation in organizations. This approach helps us identify ways in which 
the anti-corruption goals can be augmented by other kinds of appeals, even when material 
incentives are scarce. We also identify four stages of the coalition-building process—
formation, credibility, expansion, and transformation—in which differing combinations 
of incentives will be necessary to address the group's most important problems and 
opportunities. Part II examines two important coalition-building efforts in light of the 
discussion thus far—Ghana's Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore Agenda Task 
Force in Bangalore, Karnataka State, India. In Part III we link those cases to our broader 
analysis, suggesting that while purposive incentives are common in the early phases of all 
coalitions, other varieties must be added to the mix. Wilson's scheme points to ways in 
which the imaginative use of incentives can aid the transition from one phase of coalition 
development to the next. We conclude with general strategic issues, suggesting ways in 
which our analysis can be applied to those questions given the important variations to be 
found among cases.  
   1
PART I: THE COALITION-BUILDING STRATEGY 
 
 
I. Introduction: Sustaining Reform 
 
Societies rarely bring corruption under control through penalties, morality campaigns, or 
administrative reforms alone. Anti-corruption coups and the "one-man show" strategy 
usually are even less successful: even if actually intended as reforms—which usually they 
are not—they weaken civil society and the press, chill political competition and demands 
for accountability, and substitute intimidation for transparency. More often, corruption 
has been reduced not so much by overreaching visions of good government as by the 
growing ability of people and groups outside the state to defend themselves against 
official abuse and to check the unfair advantages of others. In 17th-century England, for 
example, Parliament became better able to curb royal abuses of power in the course of a 
long struggle with the Crown over issues as diverse as taxation, religion, and crown 
patronage (Roberts, 1980; Johnston, 1993). That sort of reform is a long-term process 
bearing real costs and risks, and often features—indeed, requires—considerable political 
contention and wrangling. But because it is sustained by self-interest and credible 
incentives it draws major segments of society into the process of reform, where they can 
demand and reward good governance in the course of pursuing their own political and 
economic goals. 
 
  This suggests that despite the past decade's advances in the areas of good 
governance, administrative reform, and economic liberalization, there is still a major 
missing piece in our reform repertoire: politics. By this we do not mean partisan 
interventions into domestic politics processes by the Bank or other international 
organizations. These are quite sensibly made off-limits to the Bank by its Terms of 
Agreement. Instead, we refer to ways in which people and groups within society can be 
mobilized to act against corruption in ways that are sustained by their own lasting 
interests. Our specific focus is upon building social action coalitions: initiatives that 
encourage and enable people and groups within developing societies to develop their own 
political capabilities and to share their resources. Not only is that a complex challenge; it 
must also be done in ways that make it clear anti-corruption coalitions are not just 
partisan interventions under another guise. With proper understanding and support, 
however, social action coalitions against corruption can become partners with reform-
minded officials, and can develop significant anti-corruption strength from within the 
societies that need reform most.  
 
  This paper offers a conceptual analysis of the sorts of incentives and exchanges 
that hold coalitions together, and of the stages and pitfalls anyone seeking to build a 
social action coalition will encounter. In Part I we borrow from James Q. Wilson's (1973) 
theory of organizational incentive systems to discuss the sorts of appeals and rewards an 
anti-corruption coalition can offer to diverse constituencies, and suggest that these are 
more numerous and flexible than a focus on material exchanges alone would indicate. We 
then outline characteristic stages of coalition development, defined by the key challenges 
leaders will confront, and suggest ways in which repertoires of incentives can be altered   2
or expanded to address each challenge. Part II takes up two coalition examples—the 
Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore Agenda Task Force in India. These 
are not intended to illustrate all possible variations on the coalition-building theme, nor to 
provide guiding examples for all other cases; rather, they illustrate the ways incentives 
can be deployed, and problems—notably, that of the coalition's degree of autonomy vis-
à-vis government—that all coalition architects must address. In Part III we develop 
conclusions regarding coalitions as tools of anti-corruption strategy, drawing upon both 
the conceptual discussion and our two examples. The result is not a step-by-step, "how-
to" guide for building coalitions: variations in social and political circumstances, and in 
the kinds of corruption problems that must be confronted, make any such attempt futile. 
Instead, we hope to influence the ways anti-corruption activists see their tasks, and 
understand the resources and constraints within which they must work. Coalitions, we 
argue, are a way to enhance political will and strengthen civil society, but they must be 
built and sustained from the inside out, linking anti-corruption action to the interests and 
agendas of those they seek to mobilize. 
 
Low- and High-Corruption Syndromes.  Comparing levels of corruption remains an 
inexact science (Johnston, 2002), and corruption problems can vary in significant ways 
from one time and place to the next. But where the problem seems to be under control, a 
variety of political, economic, and social processes and institutions play key roles. These 
include sound political and economic institutions. In addition, vigorous but open and 
well-structured competition in both arenas means there are alternatives to exploitation 
and meaningful avenues of recourse and appeal. These are not only worthwhile goals in 
themselves, but also help moderate corruption and, over the long run, facilitate further 
development. There is no society that is totally free of corruption, and no strategy can 
guarantee successful development forever. Still, sustained and balanced development in 
both the political and economic realms can foster a low-corruption equilibrium (Johnston, 
1998).  
 
Elsewhere, however, entrenched corruption hampers political and economic 
development, undermining institutions and impeding competitive participation in both 
arenas. Anti-corruption forces and civil society remain weak; formal boundaries and links 
between politics and the economy are poorly institutionalized and lack credibility, while 
the real connections and decision processes are the corrupt ones. In such a setting, 
corruption both reflects and helps perpetuate weak and uneven development; it faces only 
weak institutional constraints and countervailing forces, and consequently can become 
deeply entrenched. When that happens, those who play by the rules—and thus, lose—
have nowhere to take a stand. Citizens will more likely respond to corruption in evasive 
or illicit ways (Alam, 1995) than by confronting it directly—reducing their risks and 
costs in the short run, but playing directly into the hands of corrupt leaders intent upon 
maintaining their power. Corruption is hardly to blame for all problems in such societies, 
but there is little doubt that it weakens the ability and will to embark upon improvements.  
 
  Thus, where corruption is generally low, it is not just fear of the law that restrains 
abuses. Much of society is involved in controlling it too. Self-interest sustains the 
demand for sound institutions, fairness, and accountable government, and social   3
sanctions—the widespread condemnation of corruption, and a refusal to see it as 
acceptable or inevitable—play a role too. This state of affairs cannot be created all of a 
piece; generally, it emerges through long processes of contention and development, as 
suggested at the outset.  
 
 
The Coalitions Strategy.       But today's high-corruption countries cannot afford to wait 
for such outcomes eventually to emerge. The pace of change in the world economy and 
the harm corruption does to growth (Mauro, 1997) mean that societies with serious 
corruption become more vulnerable to forces beyond their control, and are missing 
development opportunities that will not last forever. The challenge is to build an anti-
corruption force rooted in society, possessing real influence, and sustained by credible 
incentives—and to build it quickly. 
 
We suggest that social action coalitions are essential to any strategy for broad-
based, sustained reform. By social action coalitions we mean self-conscious, freely-
organized, active, and lasting alliances of elites, organizations, and citizens sharing 
partially overlapping political goals—in this instance, including but not restricted to the 
control of corruption—and a basic commitment to peaceful reform.
1 These coalitions 
unite elites and civil society in a multi-faceted program of reform
2, deepening and 
rewarding political will while strengthening civil society.  They are distinct from formal 
party coalitions (Geddes, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1999), but are more concrete than mere 
coordination or consultation groups (Wilson, 1973: 267-68), as they must be able to 
resolve internal conflicts, redirect members' actions in limited ways, and back up a 
strategy of action with meaningful incentives not available to outsiders. 
 
Such coalitions—particularly where economic resources are scarce, and where 
formal organizations are the target constituents—are not easy to build, and may be even 
more difficult to sustain. At their best, they offer a range of incentives to many different 
kinds of constituencies and stakeholders. But that is also one of their main problems, for 
their projects and appeals may conflict with each other, and potential backers' agendas 
will very likely overlap only partially at best. Circumstances matter, too: if the regime is 
repressive, openly exploitative, or skilled at using its resources to undermine the coalition 
and co-opt its members, the most determined efforts may come to naught. 
 
  Still, social action coalitions are the best strategy we have for creating a visible, 
legitimate reform movement quickly, and for mobilizing resources from within a society. 
They allow reform constituencies to "borrow" size and resources from each other as they 
work together. Even more important in the long run, the internal incentive systems of 
coalitions can sustain reform after initial enthusiasm has faded, and can help protect 
members from reprisals. Particularly critical is their potential for moderating costs and 
risks for "first movers"—that is, those who take the first steps against corruption in the 
                                                 
1 On the theory and analysis of coalitions, see Gamson, 1964; Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Burgess and 
Robinson, 1969; Groennings et. al., 1970; Rounds, 1970; and Mahon and Bigelow, 1990.   
2 For studies of coalitions and public participation in reform, see Tendler, 1979; Hede et. al., 1992; 
Nickson, 1996; Clay, 1997; Klitgaard and Baser, 1997; and Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, 1998.    4
face of both popular apathy and entrenched opposition from corrupt interests. In a way, 
we propose to build a "clean machine"—like urban political machines, a broad-based, but 
unified organization that rewards diverse constituencies for active support. Unlike corrupt 
machines, however, the coalitions we have in mind are open, honestly managed and 
aimed at reform. 
 
We believe social action coalitions can, over time, mobilize the kind of broad-
based interests and participation found in low-corruption societies. Doing so involves 
many obstacles, however, and requires us to discuss more than targets, tactics, and good 
intentions. We focus primarily upon the middle-level question of incentives—that is, 
what benefits a coalition can offer to supporters—and upon ways of acquiring and 
deploying incentives sufficient to outweigh the costs and risks of reform. We lay out a 
typology of incentives, analyze the different constituencies they can attract, and identify 
important stages in a coalition's development. Then we turn to two contemporary 
examples of coalition-building, applying our discussion of incentives to each, and 
identifying strengths and weaknesses in each case. In a final section, we return to 
questions of strategy, and of assessing progress. The result will not be a coalition-
building toolkit, but rather a way of thinking about the strategy that will help reformers 




II. "Political Will" and The Role of Civil Society 
 
Coalitions themselves are not a new idea. Indeed, they are in a way the default option for 
anyone seeking to jump-start broad-based reform.
3 Many groups pursue variations on this 
strategy: the best-known effort is Transparency International, but others such as The Asia 
Foundation have been involved, and agencies such as the World Bank Institute and 
USAID have actively aided such efforts. Coalition-building drives often begin with much 
fanfare, and in some places they thrive; too often, however, they prove difficult to 
sustain—particularly where they are needed most.  Even ardent advocates are likely to 
agree that we do not know enough about making the transition from launch to long-term 
viability, or about ways of shifting from leadership-driven initiatives to the self-
sustaining, polycentric forces that help check corruption in some societies. 
  
Consider two of the most frequent responses to corruption: calls for "political 
will" on the part of officials, and for strengthening civil society. Both ideas have obvious 
merit. Political will—credible, demonstrated, and sustained commitment to reform—is 
essential to overcoming apathy and outright opposition, to setting clear priorities, and to 
mobilizing people and resources (see, for Uganda, Ruzindana, 1997). Such leadership can 
have important demonstration effects: officials who see corrupt colleagues losing jobs 
and going to jail are more likely to mend their ways than those whose leaders wink at 
misconduct (or, worse, actively participate in it). Without demonstrated political will, 
anti-corruption programs become empty gestures, or camouflage for continued abuses.  
 
                                                 
3 Our thanks to Dr. Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi for his comments on this point.   5
  A strong civil society—self-organizing cooperative activity at the level between 
the state and the household—is critical as well (for a variety of studies see Pharr and 
Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2000; on the connections between social trust and corruption, see 
Uslaner, 2001). As elusive as "strengthening civil society" may be in practice, it can 
provide anti-corruption agencies with critical information and support, uphold a 
framework of values (Cooter, 1997), provide mutual support activities, build the 
organizational base and skills citizens need to take on shared problems, and help open 
alternatives to mistreatment by corrupt officials. Where civil society is comparatively 
strong, corruption attracts what Weber called "social sanctions"—popular condemnation 
reinforcing, and often carrying as much weight as, official standards and penalties. 
Fighting corruption will be lonely, often risky, business, and everyday dealings among 
citizens, and with officials, may be a game of sauve qui peut.  
 
  Political will and a strong civil society can reinforce each other—a pattern seen in 
many low-corruption countries. Particularly where electoral democracy is viable, civil 
society can reward leaders and parties demonstrating effective leadership and penalize 
those who fail. Even where democracy is only partially functional, civil society can still 
give valuable support to reform-oriented leaders. For their part, such leaders can provide 
citizens a measure of protection, and open up political and economic alternatives to 
corrupt exploitation. 
 
  But political will is often misunderstood, and a strong civil society seldom 
emerges simply because it is needed. Neither can be invoked as a deus ex machina: they 
are outcomes, not inputs, of broad-based political and social changes. Indeed, in low-
corruption societies political will is not just an attribute of particular leaders, but rather is 
widely shared across the politically active population. Political will is not just a matter of 
elites' deciding to be good: they must have reason to think that it is in their interests to 
move against corruption. That is why independent, self-interested groups are so important 
to reform: those who would abuse power, or acquire it illicitly, must in take the reactions 
of others into account. Conversely, that is why the "one-man show" scenario of reform so 
often fails: the will of a strongman can be used for ill, just as easily as for good, and few 
if any countervailing forces exist in society to check him. As for a strong civil society: we 
cannot just urge citizens to act. They need leadership, a measure of security, credible 
prospects that their actions will yield benefits, and an organizational base. They need to 
know about each other—literally, that they are not alone. These are high thresholds, 
particularly for those who are vulnerable to corruption because of poverty, 
powerlessness, and isolation. Where can they, and we, begin?  
 
 
III. Minimal Conditions and Basic Strategy 
 
Social action coalitions will not thrive everywhere. To have any chance of success, they 
require a functioning state rather the misrule of dictators, private armies or mafias. 
Leaders must have a genuine intent to govern well—not as easy a test to apply as it may 
seem—and to serve rather than exploit their societies. A reasonable level of order is also 
essential; pervasive violence (as in Colombia), famine or disease (as with the African   6
AIDS crisis), or social disintegration (as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or parts of 
Russia) can render coalition building impossible and corruption a secondary problem.  
Meaningful boundaries and legitimate linkages between state and society are essential if 
there are to be working limits on both official power and private influence, as well as the 
"space" required for a viable civil society and private economy.  Where basic civil 
liberties—freedom to organize, assemble, and voice criticism of the regime (Isham, 
Kaufmann, and Pritchett, 1996)—and freedom from routine coercion are a reality, people 
and groups will feel more secure about opposing corruption. Equally important is a 
reasonably free press; not only can it become a "watchdog", it is also essential to some of 
the coalition's incentives, as we shall see.    
 
Also useful at the outset, if not essential, is a crisis or opportunity (Wilson, 1973: 
275) making action imperative.  Hong Kong's famous ICAC—whose anti-corruption 
strategy included extensive public involvement from the beginning—originated after a 
corrupt police official's escape touched off mass outrage. Its first step toward winning 
public confidence was to bring him back to Hong Kong for trial and imprisonment. 
Outside support from NGOs, aid partners and international organizations, including law-
enforcement, pro-democracy and anti-corruption groups, will provide essential resources, 
expertise, and encouragement. Ultimately, however, opposition to corruption must 
become the norm—not a response to crisis—and coalitions must become not only self-
sustaining but polycentric. Early opportunities will give way to different, but no less 
difficult, challenges as the coalition matures. 
 
Strategic Questions.   Who will be our basic constituencies and stakeholders, how do we 
attract their sustained support, and what do we ask of them? Virtually everyone suffers 
from serious corruption, so almost anyone is a potential member. But most costs of 
corruption, even when they are recognized (and often they are not), are long-term and 
widely shared; some of the most important costs—lost political opportunities, reduced 
accountability of government—are intangible or difficult to document. The costs can be 
most compelling for those who have the least, but for those people the risks of reform are 
at least as compelling, if not more so. Beneficiaries of corruption, on the other hand, have 
resources, connections, and a tangible stake in the status quo. Thus many citizens may 
not feel a compelling reason at any given time to act against corruption at any one time, 
nor perceive a meaningful chance of success if they did. These are classic problems of 
collective action: many of the benefits of reduced corruption, such as honest and efficient 
administration, enhanced political choices, and a more vibrant economy, will benefit 
everyone if they are realized for anyone. This, together with the costs and risks of 
backing reform—particularly in early phases—make it tempting to be a free rider (Olson, 
1965).  
 
  Thus, early recruitment of support should focus on potential stakeholders who 
suffer immediate and tangible costs of corruption, and have resources they can mobilize 
against it. Businesses, both small and larger, are obvious candidates, but may be 
compromised by corrupt linkages of their own. Other constituencies can also be large and 
potentially important: farmers and stallholders in markets who are subject to police 
shakedowns, for example. But those constituencies may also be atomized and dispersed   7
over large amounts of territory, or may be divided along ideological or communal lines. 
The best compromise at this level may be to work through existing networks, both at the 
social level and in more organized segments of politics and the economy, educating 
people about the costs of corruption while searching for those who find them most 
oppressive.   
 
  Autonomy is a basic issue too (see, for discussions in the context of civil society 
and non-governmental organizations in Africa, Bratton, 1989, and Bratton, 1994). What 
sort of relationship should a coalition have with the regime—fighting from the opposition 
corner, or cooperating? As we shall see below, in our discussion of cases, this is a 
continuing problem for some coalitions. To some extent the answer depends upon the 
political options generally available. Where political and administrative leaders are 
hostile to reform, cooperation may be impossible, and an anti-corruption coalition can be 
forced into an opposition role. That, clearly, bears real disadvantages: reform in that 
setting amounts to mobilizing the weak and divided against the strong. Coalition 
architects may have to play a waiting game, learning and working the social networks 
and educating possible stakeholders, but holding off on major initiatives until the political 
climate improves. In a competitive democracy circumstances are much more favorable, 
but strategy can still be complex: an unrelieved adversarial stance will be 
counterproductive or dangerous while too little independence will undermine 
credibility—particularly if one's political allies are found to be compromised themselves. 
Perhaps the most workable compromise is to remain nonpartisan.   
 
Without doubt, the most important thing is to be forthright about opposing 
corruption wherever it occurs. But over the longer term a reform coalition must offer 
officials reasons and incentives to oppose corruption, help them develop the means with 
which to do so, and reward them for good-faith effort. For that reason, a generally 
cooperative stance will be desirable wherever it is possible. This will reduce the 
likelihood of official reprisals, thus helping coalition leaders control strain within the 
coalition (Wilson, 1973: 30-31) by keeping risks moderate and evenly shared. Ordinarily, 
the group should not become an investigative body, a whistleblower, or an anti-
corruption vigilante force. Non-corrupt political leaders will not welcome such 
disruptions, and may withdraw their support and curtail access to information. Corrupt 
leaders, or those "on the fence" about reform, will become much more hostile. Similarly, 
the coalition should resist any temptation to become a certification body: conferring 
"seals of approval" creates large risks and offers few rewards. Such projects may entail 
complicated analysis beyond the capacity of coalition members; once given, such 
approval will be difficult to withdraw. Credit for successes will flow to those being 
"certified", while the coalition will be seriously damaged should recipients turn out to be 
corrupt. (And, ultimately, the goal is to develop the capacity of official agencies to 
practice honest, transparent government on their own, and to encourage journalists and 
citizens to perform important oversight functions.) Instead, the coalition can help reform-
oriented politicians locate and unite those both within and without government who 
oppose corruption, and provide the information, incentives, and mutual support they need 
to move effectively against it. Efforts to publicize—and to give regime leaders and   8
coalition backers the opportunity to take credit for—successes can create incentives to 




IV.  Building and Sustaining Social Action Coalitions 
 
Social action coalitions offer many advantages, but a good idea and the 
prospective benefits of controlling corruption are not enough. In the medium term, active 
support of a coalition competes—and, in some respects, can conflict—with members' 
existing interests and agendas. Organizations—ranging from trade unions to business and 
professional groups to social organizations without major political programs, all with 
their own agendas, outlooks, and problems—will be particularly important members, and 
yet lasting coalitions among organizations are rare (Wilson, 1973: 267). Other 
participants may have a quasi-organizational base: journalists, for example, may back the 
coalition as individuals, and yet their effectiveness depends upon their connections with 
media organizations, and upon the vitality and independence of the latter. For 
organization leaders there are many reasons not to join a coalition, or to support it in 
more than perfunctory ways, while the payoffs are small and uncertain. Joining a 
coalition may be a drain upon scarce resources, and can muddle an organization's 
identity. Adding a new mission, even as a partner in a broader front, may induce or 
worsen internal strains (members of a business group, for example, may want honest 
administration but oppose restrictions on political contributions). Anti-corruption activity 
may threaten carefully nurtured relationships with government or opposition officials.  
Autonomy is of particular importance to organizational elites (Ibid., 272-75), and may be 
seem to be threatened by a substantial commitment to a coalition—the more so as it 
grows in size and strength. Leaders of formal organizations will likely calculate costs and 
benefits more ruthlessly than will individuals—after all, the decision may have serious 
implications for the group, and thus for their own status. Coalition-builders will need to 
persuade elites that their groups' resources, unity and autonomy will not be threatened—
ideally, that they will increase in a less corrupt future—and are at risk should corruption 
go unchecked. This is not to suggest that organizations will never join a coalition; more 
likely they will give symbolic support but withhold hard resources and public backing in 
time of controversy.  For mass-membership organizations such as women's groups and 
citizen advocacy organizations, these problems may be less pronounced (Ibid., 203-4): 
members may press the leadership to support anti-corruption efforts, particularly in the 
wake of major scandals, and leaders may do so as visible evidence they have taken 
action. But this assumes that civil society is comparatively strong and free to criticize the 
regime—conditions that may not apply where corruption is worst. 
 
The Costs of Reform. For both individual and potential organizational allies, reform has 
real risks and costs. Opposing corruption means taking on powerful interests, often in a 
framework where institutions and the rule of law are weak. Many people and groups will 
have been compromised by corruption. Others may have a stake in the status quo, such as 
a useful friendship with a patron. For them, backing reform can mean foregoing real 
benefits, or at least a superficial sense of security, in exchange for the uncertain prospect   9
of something better—very likely, something widely-shared—at some uncertain point in 
the future. Particularly for the "first movers" who come out early for reform, these risks 
and costs can be substantial. A different, but equally problematical, logic applies to 
"blocking coalitions" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989)—those 
who benefit from the early stages of reform but then seek to prevent further progress. We 
might imagine a group of businesspeople who, by resisting corruption among government 
inspectors in their industry, manage to lower their own costs, but then oppose the higher 
taxes necessary to pursue similar reforms benefiting others.  
  
  This does not mean coalition building is futile. Skillful leadership can make the 
current costs of corruption, and the future benefits of reform, credible and compelling. 
And we should not underestimate the demonstration effects of finding a few prominent 
"champions" in both the public and private sectors—people willing to lead the fight, and 
to show others they are not alone.  
 
The goal is to foster broad-based anti-corruption activity at many levels of 
society, based upon self-interest and a sense of efficacy, rather than crusades doomed to 
become noble failures. Reform must eventually take on a life independent of particular 
leaders' backing, and of the efforts of any one anti-corruption group. A successful anti-
corruption coalition may, in the long run, fade into the background of the vibrant civil 
society it helps create (though there will always be need for a group to keep the 
corruption issue alive). Getting to that point is, of course, a long and challenging process. 
How can we build this sort of coalition, and what can hold it together over the long run? 
 
 
V. What's In It for Me? Thinking about Incentives 
 
James Q. Wilson, in his classic work Political Organizations (1973), offers an enduring 
typology of the incentives that motivate and reward organizational participation. He did 
this by way of challenging the economism of Olson (1965) and others who argued that 
organizations seeking broadly shared goals would almost inevitably fall prey to "free 
rider" problems. Wilson, noting that such groups do form and persist for long periods, 
and that people act out of diverse motives, reasoned that successful organizations must 
offer members more than just a chance to achieve a goal. These incentives, he argued, 
were of four major types (see Wilson, 1973: 33-51): 
 
Material incentives: rewards of tangible value, such as money, goods, or jobs. 
 
Purposive incentives: the accomplishment of a significant goal—often, the formal 
purpose of the organization.  Members of a group that succeeds in cleaning up a 
city's parks do create a benefit available to all residents, but still derive a special 
satisfaction flowing from their membership and contribution toward that goal. 
 
Specific solidarity incentives: "...intangible rewards arising out of the act of 
associating that can be given to, or withheld from, specific individuals. Indeed, 
their value usually depends on the fact that some persons are excluded from their   10
enjoyment (Ibid.: 33-34)". Such incentives include offices, honors, and other 
recognition; the prestige accruing to a donor who provides a "naming gift" to a 
university ethics center, for example, would be a large specific solidary incentive.  
 
Collective solidarity incentives:   "...intangible rewards created by the act of 
associating that must be enjoyed by a group if they are to be enjoyed by anyone 
(Ibid.: 34)", but which (unlike purposive accomplishments) are still restricted to 
the group itself. These include, for example, the prestige of affiliation; sociability 
and fellowship; and perhaps a degree of exclusivity.  
 
These types of incentives are useful both for analyzing, and for categorizing, 
organizations. 
 
Wilson also identifies sub-categories important to our discussion. Material 
incentives may be exclusive or individual (Ibid.: 36-37). Exclusive material incentives 
are available to all members, but only to members (the mutual-assistance schemes created 
by immigrant organizations in 19th-century American cities, or by village associations in 
African cities today, are examples; so are the discounts on travel or insurance offered by 
fraternal and professional groups). Individual material incentives are given to some 
members and withheld from others (and are never offered to outsiders); patronage jobs 
distributed by a political machine are a classic example.  Among purposive organizations, 
Wilson identifies goal-oriented, ideological, and redemptive organizations (Ibid.: 46-47). 
The first seek specific changes in their surroundings (e.g., cleaner parks), while the 
second mount a comprehensive critique of society or of human nature and envision 
sweeping change (e.g. a new system of property ownership). A redemptive purposive 
group, which Wilson acknowledges as difficult to define, not only aims to change society 
but also "...to change its members by requiring them to exemplify in their own lives the 
new order" (Ibid.: 47). Militant religious sects might fit this category. It is tempting to 
think of anti-corruption groups as redemptive, but in most instances they are not; in fact, 
redemptive groups face special problems. Many end up walling themselves off from the 
societies they seek to redeem, rather than building a broad base for action, while others 
fall prey to internal disputes over what the redemptive cause requires of people in 
practice.  
 
What Can Incentives Do?     The most obvious incentives for an anti-corruption coalition 
are purposive: the goal, after all, is better politics and administration. But most 
organizations use diverse, overlapping incentives aimed at multiple constituencies—and 
that is likely to be particularly true of a social action coalition. The broader its agenda and 
the more segments of civil society it seeks to mobilize, the truer this will be. A social 
action coalition must be many things to many people and groups; it cannot be effective 
simply by proclaiming a noble purpose, or by bombarding a problem with good ideas. At 
the same time, different sorts of incentives serve different purposes and, as we shall see, 
become critical at different phases in the coalition's life cycle.  
 
Two incentive problems arise immediately. First—and particularly where 
corruption is worst—reformers will have few material resources with which to sustain   11
themselves, much less to offer to others, and yet the material enticements of corruption 
are all too familiar. Second, the agenda may seem risky and unlikely to succeed, and thus 
purposive incentives may not be credible. 
 
The first problem will be familiar to anyone who has ever belonged to an 
organization—particularly to those who have watched a group become so consumed with 
fund-raising that it loses sight of its original purposes. But it has other ramifications as 
well. One reason reformers might lack material resources is that corrupt interests can 
monopolize opportunities within an economy that is unlikely to be robust to begin with. 
Many businesses and individuals will deal with corrupt officials and their clients—
responding to corruption illicitly, in Alam's (1995) terms—or tolerate and avoid them 
(responding evasively), because they perceive few alternatives. Joining an anti-corruption 
coalition thus means taking on risks and costs—losing the few corrupt benefits one now 
receives, as well as taking on new uncertainties. Initially at least, the coalition may offer 
little compensation.  
 
Thus arises the second problem: while reduced corruption would bring substantial 
benefits, those are long-term prospects at best. An incentive system based mostly on 
purposive appeals thus is "fragile": it is open to conflict over strategy and tactics and 
vulnerable to outside events.  An election result, changed economic circumstances, or the 
rise of some hotter new issue, for example, can weaken the appeal of purposive 
incentives dramatically. An anti-corruption agenda in particular may seem goal-oriented 
to some and redemptive to others, with conflict the likely result. Wilson argues that 
purposive incentives must be relatively non-controversial (Wilson, 1973: 43). Causes 
rather than issues, and cooperation rather than conflict, will be essential if the coalition is 
to avoid threatening the interests of its own members (and thus the autonomy of 
organizational members) and antagonizing the regime. Work will consist, not of the sorts 
of crusades and condemnations likely to keep a mass constituency aroused, but rather of 
discrete tasks—raising auditing standards, for example, cutting down the number of steps 
in routine bureaucratic functions, or building information networks. These, in turn, will 
require staff and leadership with considerable sophistication and staying power—and 
such a staff will need to be paid.  
 
Purposive incentives thus must be supplemented by others that will attract the 
support of people and groups able to contribute funds and other scarce resources.  
Specific solidary incentives (Ibid., 208-210) can be crucial in this regard. They can be 
targeted to particular members and benefactors: offices, honors and citations, and 
exclusive access to information, can motivate support for the coalition. The staff salaries 
and resources noted above also fall into this category; purposive appeals might launch the 
coalition, but solidary resources are critical in sustaining it. Collective solidary 
incentives, such as sociability, prestige and a sense of mutual support, are also valuable, 
particularly where civil society is weak. Such appeals—notably, prestige—require an 
"audience" in order to be effective (Ibid.: 40): leaders may hand out all manner of 
"Corruption-Fighter" awards, for example, but if no one hears of them they are of little 
value. A relatively free press is an essential partner in making these incentives work.  
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Unlike corrupt political machines, social action coalitions are unlikely to possess 
extensive individual material incentives; if available at all they may create internal 
contention. They can also be deployed from without, in manipulative and divisive ways, 
by corrupt officials and their cronies. But a coalition can provide exclusive material 
incentives—things of real value, perhaps created by the coalition's own efforts, that can 
be restricted to members only. Access can be controlled, and converted into support for 
the coalition, by insisting upon contributions or labor from members. In New York City, 
for example, teams in a youth soccer organization were recently given preferential access 
to a City-owned playing field after they worked on renewing its facilities. In a crowded 
city access to such facilities is of real value, even if it does not make individuals 
wealthier. The immigrant savings and mutual-aid groups noted above were founded in 
difficult circumstances by poor people, but nonetheless pooled small individual 
contributions to provide valuable aid available only to members. An anti-corruption 
coalition could emulate this model by setting up a kind of "corruption insurance" scheme 
in which members pool information and resources, and make binding pacts not to pay 
bribes. Such pacts could reduce the risks flowing both from corruption itself, and from 
coalition membership, and through mutual aid reduce the costs of corrupt pressures that 
cannot be avoided. This idea will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
What might the overall incentive system of an anti-corruption coalition look like, 
and which incentives would appeal to what members and constituents? The following 
table offers some general ideas:   13
Coalition-Building Incentives, 
By Type and Target Constituency 
(categories drawn from Wilson, 1973) 
 
       MATERIAL    SPECIFIC  SOLIDARY    COLLECTIVE  SOLIDARY   PURPOSIVE 
Exclusive         Individual   ____________________  _______________________   Goal-Oriented* 
 
"Corruption         Econ benefits  Data/information banks                Prestige, improved image    Reform as public   
Insurance"           of improved   —on corrupt agencies,                   -domestically, internationally                 good 
             economy        officials                   
           —on best practices      Enhanced autonomy for                Better governance 
Information             Security from              organizations, press,    
  -vulnerability           better     Research products        opposition leaders,      Fair political,  
    assessments           governance              civil society groups       economic processes; 
                 s o c i a l   e q u i t y  
    -prevention     Rewards,  recognition    Sociability,  fellowship,   
    within orgs                    mutual encouragement                Stronger economic, 
    -legal  and  tech-                 social  institutions 
            n i c a l   a d v i c e                       
                
               E n h a n c e d   R u l e    
  of Law  
Prime constituencies: 
Small firms,          Citizens                 Professional coalition      Mass membership    Mass  membership 
domestic             generally                 staff, researchers      Journalists        NGOs 
entrepreneurs          Civil society,   Benefactors,  financial    NGO  leaders     Aid/lending  partners 
and investors            NGOs                        supporters     Government  elites    Democracy  groups 
           Anti-corruption                                and supporters 
       " c h a m p i o n s "  
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
* Ideological and Redemptive sub-types of purposes not recommended   14
The "Clean Machine": Putting Incentive Systems to Work.       The table above gives only 
a general illustration of the range of incentives available to a social action coalition 
seeking to supplement purposive appeals. Even though it may lack the kinds of individual 
material incentives available to corrupt politicians and bureaucrats, such a coalition can 
offer many other things to a variety of constituencies—and indeed must do so. 
   
Of these, exclusive material and specific solidary incentives may be the least 
familiar. They will, however, be the most effective at attracting sustained support from 
small to medium business firms, domestic entrepreneurs, and investors—precisely those 
to whom a coalition must turn for material resources. Information can be of real value. It 
may take the form of technical assistance: vulnerability assessments focusing upon 
corruption risks within or from outside a firm could be performed for active coalition 
backers. Training programs, advice on auditing requirements and internal control 
systems, and a data bank on best practices or risk assessments elsewhere can be of real 
value. Whether these services be provided on a fee-per-use basis, or made available to 
members paying a regular subscription—the preferred option—they are reasons to join 
and support a coalition, to maintain it as a main point of reference for those concerned 
about corruption, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of paid staff. Recognition is a 
similar incentive: coalition leaders should spare no efforts in giving awards, citations, and 
favorable publicity to key backers as well as to anti-corruption "champions" in 
government—but of course, must target them carefully so as to minimize risks of future 
embarrassments should those recognized turn out to have something to hide. 
 
Other benefits consist of offsetting the costs of corruption itself. The "corruption 
insurance" proposed above might take several forms: technical assistance, pooling funds 
for legal assistance and partial compensation of those hurt most by corrupt demands, and 
active support for whistleblowers are just a few examples. At another level, the coalition 
could broker integrity pacts among firms in a sector of industry, or among bidders for 
large contracts, as exemplified by Transparency International's "Islands of Integrity" 
initiatives. These can create confidence that refusing to pay bribes does not mean that one 
is not just handing advantages to competitors; pledges could be given added weight by 
requiring bidders to post a small deposit, to be forfeited if they do engage in corruption. 
Some of these services could be offered to government officials, though care must be 
taken, particularly in the early phases, not to antagonize the superiors to whom they 
report. In both the private and public sectors, such activities can provide a focal point—
and a measure of strength in numbers—for those who wish to abstain from corrupt 
dealings but have felt isolated in the past.   
 
With its base in both sectors, the coalition can also monitor and report publicly on 
privatization and deregulation schemes, civil service reforms, plans for devolution and 
decentralization of official functions, and campaigns for improved administrative 
controls. As noted above, however, the goal is not to demonstrate the absence of 
corruption.  That remains the responsibility of public officials, auditors, and oversight 
bodies. The coalition's role is to help them take credit for successes while ensuring that 
failures will not go unnoticed. In effect these are steps toward rewarding, and broadening 
the base of, political will, while strengthening the role of civil society.   15
  Collective solidary incentives—sociability, prestige—may seem an afterthought, 
or even a luxury, but in fact they will be essential to maintaining mass support, and with 
it the coalition's visibility and legitimacy. It is no accident that the Hong Kong ICAC's 
highly regarded public education campaigns have long included a component of fun and 
social activity, particularly for young people. For journalists, honest contractors and 
officials, and the leaders of participating organizations, a kind of security can flow from 
membership: those who conceal corruption or practice intimidation may think twice if 
they know their critics are backed by a larger group. Conversely, coalition members 
tempted by offers of money for silence, for example, have something important to lose if 
they are found out—membership of a prestigious and visible group. Such incentives may 
be difficult to quantify, but they show how a solid coalition can, through aggressive use 
of multiple sorts of incentives, alter the calculus of corruption and reform.  
 
VI. Getting Started: Stages of Coalition-Building 
 
Both the targets and tactics of anti-corruption efforts, and the development of the 
coalition itself, will be influenced by the character of the society within which they are 
launched. The state, trajectory, and sources of economic development; the degree of 
democratization, and quality of institutions and political competition; legitimacy of 
government and nature of a country's communal and political culture(s); and its 
international situation will all be major considerations. Moreover, virtually all of the 
factors in that list have important historical dimensions that will vary from case to case, 
and that will shape current problems and options in critical ways. That list could be made 
much longer; a full consideration of such factors lies well beyond the scope of this 
analysis, though clearly we will be able to learn more about them to the extent that we 
study coalition building comparatively. 
 
  We can, however, outline general stages in the coalition-building process. Doing 
so helps us both to specify specific major tasks that must be addressed at each stage, and 
to understand how incentives must be created and deployed. The result is not a coalition-
building toolkit—such would be of doubtful value given the variations noted above—but 
rather a rough guide to setting priorities and assessing progress as the process unfolds.  
 
  The table on the following page presents one approach to sequencing.
4 Four 
stages are identified: formation, in which the core of a coalition is organized, early 
leaders and "champions" are identified, and an agenda takes shape; credibility, in which 
the coalition demonstrates that it can act effectively and it is thus worthy of support from 
a variety of stakeholders and constituencies; expansion, a particularly critical stage in 
which a small organization builds a broader social and resource base while retaining 
coherence and effectiveness; and finally, transformation, during which the coalition does 
not so much grow as become polycentric, taking initiatives on many fronts and drawing 
strength from many sources. During that last stage, in effect, it realizes the goal of 
combining broad-based political will with the protean qualities of a strong civil society.    
                                                 
4 We thank . Soji Apampa for his very thoughtful and detailed comments on this and other points.   16
Stages of Coalition Evolution 
P h a s e     T a s k s       A g e n t s     M a i n   I n c e n t i v e s   
 
1. Formation    Taking initiative; cooperation   Anti-corruption      Purposive 
      Agenda-setting                    "champions"   
        —corruption as an issue 
        —early targets and tactics 
 
2.  Credibility   Early  success;  giving/    "Champions"    Purposive 
       taking  credit     Networks    Collective  solidary 
      Identifying/linking to                   —social  
 social networks;                   —organizational 
      Articulating a future                     —official 
   Finding  resources;  Publicity 
 
3. Expansion    Extending networks                Early Coalition      Specific solidary 
      Identify backers, stakeholders                 —leaders      Collective solidary 
      Building core staff, expertise                     —extended networks    Purposive 
      Sharing information                                      (note shifting  
        —on coalition's activities                                                               incentives in this 
        —on techniques                            phase!)  
       
4. Transformation  Polycentric action, agendas    Mature Coalition    Purposive 
      Diffusion, institutionalization                  —overall coordination               Specific solidary 
  of political will                              —dispersed leadership               Exclusive material 
Empowerment of stakeholders,                  —extended network    Collective solidary 
 civil society 
                                       Counteracting costs and risks of 
                corruption 
 
Notes: Most tasks carry over to later stages, and in a Mature Coalition are delegated across a dispersed 
    leadership; Incentives are listed in rough order of emphasis during a given phase   17
  These stages will not necessarily be sharply demarcated in practice. Indeed, to 
some extent later stages subsume earlier ones without supplanting them. Still, identifying 
these stages may be useful not only for setting priorities, but also for anticipating 
problems, needs, and sources of support, and for understanding emergent stresses within 
the coalition and responding to them appropriately. 
 
The most important changes from one phase to the next have at least as much to 
do with enhancing—and sustaining—the complexity of the coalition, its repertoire of 
incentives, its constituency base, and its agenda, as with increasing size. A newly-
launched anti-corruption coalition that deploys only purposive incentives and seeks only 
to expand will, in the long run, be able to do neither: purposive incentives alone will not 
help it grow, and without growing it is unlikely to acquire the resources to accomplish its 
purposes.  The incentive system must become more elaborate, attracting new kinds of 
supporters and addressing the corruption problems that concern them; at the same time 
the coalition must demonstrate credibility—that it is worthy of support and that the future 
it envisions is not only desirable but achievable.  
 
  For this reason growth per se may be a third-stage priority. More important, early 
on, will be identifying "leaders and champions" in both the public and private sectors, 
building cooperative relationships among them, and then moving on to some visible early 
successes. Those, as Klitgaard et. al. (2000) point out, should not necessarily be the most 
serious corruption problems in a society; attacking those may guarantee defeat. Instead, 
they argue for "picking the low-hanging fruit"—that is, making sure the early struggles 
are won. Such successes, well publicized, are essential to building support and winning 
resources. In this same connection, reformers are typically told to "fry a big fish"—that 
is, to arrest, and convict or oust, a prominent corruption ringleader. This is undoubtedly 
good advice in principle, and can be a major step toward breaking officials' sense of 
impunity. But "big fish" have big friends, as well as enemies; coalition leaders must 
move carefully, for their credibility in the eyes of civil society may be much more 
doubtful. They must be absolutely certain that their cooperative relationship with regime 
leadership is genuine and strong enough to withstand considerable controversy. Once a 
variety of early victories have been notched up, and after the fish fry has ended, a 
coalition can possess considerable prestige that can be parlayed into solidary incentives.  
 
Early growth may be best pursued by working within established social and 
political networks; later on, those can be expanded much further into civil society. The 
transition from winning credibility to expansion may seem relatively simple, but in fact 
this transition is trickiest of all: the resource requirements of expansion, and the internal 
stresses of attaining it, must not be allowed to weaken leadership, coherence, and 
credibility. Making that more difficult is the fact that as long as growth is a goal in itself 
(and at some point in the coalition's development, it must be so), purposive incentives 
may have to take a back seat to others that draw constituencies into the group—most 
likely, specific and collective solidary. This is not to imply that purposes are unimportant 
in this phase; indeed, they cannot be obscured, or else the coalition will fall into the trap 
of "goal displacement"—that is, a kind of limbo in which organizational maintenance 
supplants longer-term goals, to the detriment of both. One way to prevent this is to   18
remember that expansion is a means, not an end in itself, and that that at some point that 
stage must end. Growth, for its own sake, has diminishing returns.  
 
  The final stage is that of a fully developed coalition sustaining itself while acting 
on many fronts. Initiative passes from core leadership to many centers of activity. And 
here, the incentive system is most complex of all, reflecting that polycentric pattern of 
action. In this stage the coalition ceases to follow any one tactical or structural plan; 
perhaps its boundaries and overall coherence become very difficult to pin down, and 
change considerably over time. But at that point, it will have succeeded in creating the 
kind of broad-based activity—sometimes contentious, and always sustained by self-
interest—that we emphasized at the beginning. It is unlikely that the coalition will put 
itself out of business, for corruption will never be completely eradicated, and a group 
monitoring and publicizing the problem will always be needed. Perhaps that group will in 
the end resemble the leaders-and-champions pattern of stage one. But the critical 
difference will be that it will be backed up by the broad-based array of interests and 
social forces that it has assembled, and set in motion, against corruption. 
 
  The table just above leaves out an obvious and critical dimension of such action: 
that is, how, specifically, to attack corruption itself? That question and a consideration of 
some contemporary examples of coalition building are the focus of Part II. The emphasis 
will not be on the changes needed to control corruption, but rather upon what a coalition 




PART II: COALITIONS IN ACTION 
 
I. What Should a Coalition Do? 
 
At the outset we suggested that social action coalitions can reinforce, and interlink, 
political will and the vitality of civil society. What does this mean in practice?  
 
Strengthening Political Will.     While political, administrative and judicial officials bear 
much of the burden of reform, a strong coalition can support, and reward, their will to see 
it through. Simply put, the coalition's support can persuade elites that they have an 
interest in reform, via popularity, enhanced development, a better international image, or 
simply their own political standing. Civil society can become a full partner, diffusing the 
will to reform through much of society, and leaders can benefit from the backing of those 
interests and groups, as long as they earn it. This entails supporting elites politically and 
socially when they do pursue reform—a task that may not be easy where corruption has 
become entrenched—while making it clear that those leaders do not own the coalition or 
the corruption issue in the long term. Ultimately, the only reliable index of political will 
is results: credible anti-corruption action that is sustained over time and in the face of 
whatever opposition emerges. 
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A coalition with a strong grassroots base can also identify the sorts of reform 
targets that will be seen as most important—advice that committed reform leaders will 
value greatly. Then, in part through its contacts with journalists and organizations in civil 
society, it can aid them in taking credit for reform successes, while making sure that 
failure to act is difficult to conceal. It can also provide valuable information on the ways 
counterparts elsewhere have dealt with the problem. Links to opposition leaders—where 
such are not dangerous—are a touchy issue here: if they are too weak, reformers may be 
seen as "front men" for the regime, and will pay a price in terms of credibility; but if they 
are too close there may be little access to officials and information in government. The 
key is to cooperate with the regime while remaining open and independent, making it 
clear that the coalition has room for all who oppose corruption.    
 
A coalition in a position to mobilize popular disapproval can also convey pointed 
political messages. Careful judgment is in order once again: cooperative ties with the 
regime are ordinarily valuable assets. Moreover, if coalition managers too frequently 
condemn failures without pointing to successes, followers decide that reform is futile. 
And as a practical matter, in some of the most corrupt societies popular opinion is of little 
significance; those who express disapproval may take significant risks only to be 
drowned out by cheerleaders for the regime. Still, targeted expressions of disapproval 
(e.g. the Sierra Club's "Dirty Dozen" lists of U.S. Congress members) may demonstrate 
that disregarding anti-corruption views has real costs while underlining the movement's 
independence. 
 
Building a Stronger Civil Society.       A strong civil society can develop, protect, and 
express important social values, and giving people and groups the "space" and security 
they need to resist corruption. Likewise, it can encourage and protect direct, rather than 
evasive or illicit responses to corruption (Alam, 1995), and open up political and 
economic alternatives to abuse by corrupt officials and their clients. In this way, a strong 
civil society can reduce the costs of corruption and the risks of opposing it directly. With 
such alternatives available, the short-term rewards of corruption become less tempting, 
the longer-term and shared costs become more clear, and the incentives to control it 
become more compelling. 
 
Over the long run, a viable civil society becomes a force for accountability in all 
but the most repressive societies. It does so through the broad mobilization of many pro-
reform interests, becoming the vehicle through which support for political will is most 
strongly conveyed. Political leaders, in turn, have more reasons to move credibly against 
corruption—even in undemocratic systems, or in democracies where political 




   Some of the most important things a coalition can do in civil society involve 
changing the ways people think about corruption. Many of its costs are known to all: 
money lost in bribe payments, time lost in dealing with corrupt officials, and 
opportunities lost to bribe-paying competitors are part of a long and familiar list. What   20
may be less well understood are the long-term, shared, and intangible costs, such as 
delayed and distorted development, the loss of political choices and accountability, and 
the mutual suspicion that corrodes business, political, and personal relationships. The task 
is to show people how corruption is involved in many of their own problems—both day-
to-day, and over the longer term. Some of these ideas will be less than obvious, for they 
are measured in terms of values, security, and opportunities that citizens have never 
possessed, and which they may believe they will never enjoy.  
 
 For that last reason it is important to break the sense that there is nothing that can 
be done. More citizens might resist paying up or concealing illicit deals, and many 
officials might "blow the whistle" and support reform, if they know they are not alone. 
They will also know the risks—and, the coalition must be frank about them: reporting 
corruption or resisting corrupt demands often means an uneven fight with powerful 
officials and their cronies. Those who have paid or taken corrupt payments in the past 
may fear, with good reason, that those dealings will be used as evidence against them by 
more powerful figures. The answer, in part, is to lengthen the time horizon—to encourage 
people to look beyond the short-term giving and getting toward the long-term 
consequences of corruption for themselves and for society. The Hong Kong example 
suggests that sustained public education can succeed in changing attitudes at a basic 
level. 
 
  At the same time, information sharing has its pitfalls. The process may become an 
echo chamber in which things "everyone knows" acquires a spurious authority through 
repetition. Reform is reduced to slogans, as has already happened, to a distressing degree, 
with terms like "political will" and "civil society". A one-size-fits-all understanding of 
what corruption is, and of what remedies must be pursued, can result: already, we too 
often see "corruption" treated as a synonym for "bribery", and essentially as a problem in 
the liberalization of international trade (Johnston, 2002). When this happens, local 
knowledge and experience are devalued and reforms reflecting local realities are less 
likely to emerge.  
 
For this reason, a social action coalition should develop research and analysis 
capabilities if at all possible. These need not be elaborate to be valuable. The tasks can be 
shared among coalition officials, journalists, and academicians, for example, and indeed 
where the political situation is uncertain they may be easier to sustain if they are 
delegated in that way. Research and analysis enable a coalition not only to work hard 
against corruption, but to be smart about it—providing convincing advice and feedback 
to elites about corruption problems and the ways they are perceived, and to citizens about 
the progress of reform. Perhaps most important, a social action coalition with at least a 
basic research capability will be much less dependent upon official reports and statistics. 
It will also serve as an independent source for those, within and without a given society, 
who want to know more about the corruption problems there. That, in turn, may be one of 
the most important early ways to earn credibility, and later on can be a source of valuable 
exclusive material incentives. Sharing such knowledge is also a way to protect 
"institutional memory" in less-secure settings.  
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Finally, an honest public education strategy will include the lesson that reform is 
costly, requires sustained support and vigilance, and will be marked by many reverses 
and crises. In fact, coalition initiatives may create an impression that corruption is on the 
increase, as cases become public knowledge and critics of corruption become more 
aggressive. Coalition leaders must do all they can to give the public a realistic picture of 
the likely consequences of reform, lest disillusionment set in. American campaign-
finance reform advocates in the 1970s, for example, largely failed to do this, with the 
result that disclosure requirements created an erroneous perception that the political 
process was suddenly up for sale. The promised new age of clean politics never quite 
materialized. As a result, advocates of new reforms now find the public's response is 
heavily tinged by cynicism. 
 
II. Two Cases 
 
Our analysis of incentives is not offered as a one-size-fits-all coalition strategy, but rather 
is aimed at helping leaders adapt to particular circumstances and constituencies. 
Similarly, no single case can illustrate all of the practical complexities of the social action 
coalition approach. Moreover, actual cases present us with moving targets: what is true at 
one point may not hold later on. Still, let us consider two cases—the relatively new 
Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore Agenda Task Force in that Indian 
city, an initiative whose origins date back nearly a decade. Both illustrate the challenges 
facing coalition architects, and both can point to possibilities for action. At the very least, 
thinking about these two cases may make it clearer how our main schema applies (or falls 
short) in other specific cases. 
 
The Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition.     The Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) 
was founded after the 9
th International Anti-Corruption Conference in Durban, South 
Africa, in October, 1999, by a cross-sectoral grouping of Government officials, official 
anti-corruption agencies, and civil society.  It merges a variety of anti-corruption 
initiatives launched in 1998 when the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice organized the first National Integrity Workshop.  GACC's goal is to mold a 
diverse range of official and private-sector interests into a coalition, working wherever 
possible with international business, civil society, the news media and religious bodies.  It 
grows out of a widely recognized need for a more structured relationship between and 
among local and international anti-corruption initiatives, and for ways of “deepening” the 
social roots of reform. The World Bank Institute’s core course, “Controlling Corruption: 
An Integrated Approach”, first piloted in June, 1999 to a diverse group of stakeholders 
from seven countries (Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Benin, Malawi, and Ethiopia), 
was a catalyst underscoring the potency of participatory approaches to corruption control. 
 
The initial Ghanaian participants included the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), and the Institute of 
Economic Affairs. The group has since expanded to include the Private Enterprise 
Foundation, the Center for Democratic Development (CDD), and the National 
Institutional Renewal Program, an office directly under the Presidency in charge of 
Ghana’s public sector reform agenda. The Ghana Journalists Association represents the   22
news media. On the civil society side, a particularly important component is the Ghana 
Integrity Initiative, the local chapter of Transparency International. It brings together a 
variety of organizations, religious groups, media representatives, legal practitioners and 
individuals committed to reform. 
 
The question of how much, and how best, to coordinate activities with the 
government is a complex one in Ghana. The new Government has indicated they do not 
intend to nominate anyone to GACC but will negotiate a framework for liaison with the 
Coalition, either through the Attorney General or the Office of Accountability.  Still, the 
Coalition has asked the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee to become a partner, 
and has made similar approaches to the Auditor General.  Former President Jerry 
Rawlings did, however, approve the coalition's request for a World Bank diagnostic 
survey on corruption.  This survey was conducted by the CDD from March to July, 2000, 
with additional support from the United Kingdom's Department for International 
Development, the Canadian International Development Association, and the United 
Nations Development Program.  These agencies have also agreed to assist GACC with 
post-survey analyses, dissemination of findings, and the formulation of specific policy 
proposals.   
 
The GACC agenda offers an ambitious set of purposive incentives, including:  
 
• Creating a forum for interaction among the three arms of government, public and 
private sector institutions, and civil society groups to work on anti-corruption strategies 
 
• Encouraging the exchange of information and joint sponsorship of programs, where 
appropriate, to achieve effective utilization of resources  
 
• Enhancing transparency and reducing opportunities for corruption in government, 
public and private institutions, and civil society organizations 
 
• Sponsoring initiatives leading to appropriate legal and institutional reforms 
 
• Strengthening the capacity of its constituent organizations and other anti-corruption 
bodies where necessary 
 
• Serving as the primary organization for the implementation of Ghana’s anti-corruption 
plan 
 
Projects contributing to those goals have included, first and foremost, the diagnostic 
survey mentioned above; in addition, GACC has prepared an action plan that will serve 
as the basis for national debate and consensus building. Coalition members are pushing 
for freedom of information and whistle-blower protection legislation, and efforts continue 
to strengthen working relationships among public agencies, the private sector and civil 
society. 
    23
Coalition building on this scale is unprecedented in Ghana, at least with respect to 
corruption issues. Moreover, GACC sees its efforts as differing from previous attempts at 
reform because they are based upon collective action and common ownership of the 
corruption issue by all stakeholders, emphasize sustained and coordinated action, and 
seek both to build synergy and eliminate duplication. GACC proposals are to be 
integrated with broader public-sector reforms with the goal of creating a national integrity 
system supporting strong and open decision-making procedures. Such goals, and the 
diverse membership of GACC, both reflect the essence and reveal the difficulties of the 
coalition strategy; a critical question will be GACC's success in backing up this ambitious 
purposive agenda with other incentives strong and diverse enough to sustain it.  
 
Thus, GACC will face serious sustainability and credibility problems.  Scarcity of 
key resources will threaten the effectiveness of the organization. GACC's total reliance 
upon foreign donors will raise questions about commitment to address the problem from 
within. The new Government's plans for an Office of Accountability, anchored in the 
President’s office and serving as the official focal point for corruption issues, is a hopeful 
sign, as is the Government's offer of liaison through the office of the Attorney General 
and Minister of Justice.  But where does this leave both CHRAJ and SFO, the two 
organizations that have the mandate to address problems of corruption and fraud in 
addition to other issues, and two “core members” of the coalition?  The future roles, and 
resources, given to those bodies will be a critical test of Government commitment to 
them, and to GACC, as will the Government's willingness to back GACC publicly and 
provide funds for its operation. 
 
Another issue central to GACC's repertoire of purposive incentives is the problem 
of setting an agenda.  Although the coalition was formed as a result of the World Bank 
Institute’s Core Course, a clear-cut and manageable agenda still has yet to emerge.  The 
coalition currently has no structure other than a category of “Core Members” (the 
participants identified above), a Secretary, and a Spokesperson.  The core group has so 
far successfully supervised the execution and release of the diagnostic survey, proposed 
an action plan, and has conducted a national workshop (as well as two regional 
workshops in Tamale and Kumasi) to disseminate survey findings and seek input from 
citizens.  However, coalition members have indicated there are no clear definitions of 
roles, which leaves them constantly engaged in “negotiations” to reach binding 
agreement. The current action plan reflects this mode of operation, and the coalition still 
needs to move to the stage of establishing credibility through early successes. While the 
goal of collegiality and collective ownership is laudable in many ways, the current 
fragmented structure and tactics of repeated internal negotiation may, in the long run, 
mean the agenda will always be ad hoc and unfocused, and will make the provision of 
solidary, as well as specific material, incentives difficult if not impossible.  GACC must 
provide such incentives, and must clearly define the roles of various institutional 
members, in order to prevent distrust from brewing among its members, and to ease 
reliance upon purposive appeals. 
 
One could argue that some of the core members, such as CHRAJ and SFO, would 
have purposive reasons to support a strong GACC because of their current institutional   24
mandates, and that they would be better able to build leverage for some of their work 
through the coalition.  This may well be so, though it may also be the case that such 
support raises questions of autonomy and resource allocation within those two 
bureaucracies.  In any event, such clear purposive incentives are weaker for other 
members who do not have an anti-corruption mandate as part of their daily work.  What 
realistic promise does GACC hold for groups such as the Private Enterprise Foundation 
(PEF)?  Can research institutes such as the Center for Democratic Development (CDD), 
or Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), be expected to conduct research without 
compensation because they are part of the coalition?  How can GACC keep coalition 
membership from being and all-cost, no-benefit proposition? Can specific solidary 
incentives be a workable substitute, and are our "corruption insurance" ideas likely to 
prove workable? A key first step to resolving some of these issues is transparency.  
GACC rules, operations, and the roles of its core members must clear to all. 
Supplementing diffuse purposive appeals with a more elaborate and sustainable system of 
incentives, however, seems an urgent challenge in GACC's case.  
 
Representation also is a major challenge for the GACC.  Should its "core 
members" be restricted to top leadership of various institutions?  Should those institutions 
not be able to send representatives to meetings where concrete decisions are made? 
Again, that presupposes clear roles and agendas.  But GACC has not been operating in 
that way; meetings have been postponed and decisions have not been taken because some 
top Executive or Core member is away and cannot attend the meeting. 
 
GACC seems likely to face a real struggle to survive its infancy unless some of 
the above problems are resolved in a transparent manner. Donors may become skeptical 
about the credibility of the coalition and tie their promised support to the resolution of 
these issues.  Coordination with Government is similarly endangered. The coalition is 
very much aware of that difficulty, at least, and concrete steps are planned.  In a recent 
resolution agreed to at the end of a National Anti-Corruption Workshop organized by the 
GACC in June, 2001 (which was attended by some Government Ministers), the 
participants called on government to demonstrate commitment to the Action plan by 
funding its programs, as well as overwhelmingly agreeing to a re-designation of the 
Action plan as the “National Anti-Corruption Action Plan”.      
 
Other immediate needs include efforts to educate the Executive, and to persuade it 
to review the partnership approach; to link anti-corruption measures to broader 
governance programs; and to rationalize public ethics infrastructure.  Expanded civil 
society and private sector involvement are also planned, as ways to stimulate demands for 
accountability.  A recent strategic focus statement released by the GACC proposes a 
series of formal and informal interactions, as well as publications to disseminate 
information, all aimed at stimulating broader discussion and a multi-stakeholder 
ownership of the Action Plan. Core members will act as a steering committee to develop 
a second tier of civil society bodies, private sector organizations and traditional 
authorities with a national character, and a third tier of community-based organizations at 
the district level.  Finally, GACC plans to strengthen its capacity to ensure effective 
coordination of the coalition-building process, emphasizing joint monitoring and   25
performance evaluation through a Sub-Committee of the Mini Consultative Group 
meeting on Ghana yearly.   
 
No one would dispute the notion that anti-corruption activity in Ghana is a 
daunting prospect. Any observer must respect the fact that GACC is a coalition-building 
effort without precedent in that society. Still, GACC continues to grapple with significant 
Formation-stage problems. The Credibility phase—perhaps the most difficult of our 
four—still looms as a major challenge. Success at that phase will require a more diverse 
and sustainable set of incentives that those available thus far. The autonomy issue 
remains very much unresolved: GACC seems at times to be both ignored by government 
and hamstrung by it. Success at the Expansion stage will require not just growth, but also 
an extension of GACC beyond its current urban/elite composition: without significant 
participation reaching deep into civil society and out into rural areas, it may remain a 
small advocacy group that is easily co-opted or ignored by the regime.  Thus, GACC 
represents both an essential beginning, and a useful illustration of the difficulties of 
coalition-building for the long term. 
  
 
Bangalore, India.  Bangalore, with a population around 6 million, is India's fifth-
largest city, and is capital of the state of Karnataka. Located in the South about midway 
between the two coasts, it has long been a center for managerial and technical education, 
and in recent years has become a focus of India's burgeoning computer software industry. 
 
  In 1993, Marketing and Business Associates (MBA) Ltd., a leading market 
research agency based in Bangalore, began gathering survey data, informant interviews 
and statistical indicators focused upon the performance of local government. This project 
was aided by funding from the World Bank Research Support Budget. The data were 
compiled into "report cards" assessing the quality of a variety of city government 
services.
5 Corruption was just one criterion for evaluation, but the results were striking: 
extensive bribery and demands for payments were reported, along with waste and 
inefficiency. One estimate had it that the overall cost of bribery "exceeded the entire 
municipal budget by a factor of seven" (Klitgaard et. al., 2000: 61). These results drew 
extensive attention and debate within local government, in the press, and among the 
public at large.  
 
One result was that three years later a second series of report cards were drawn up 
to assess trends. It was decided that prior to public disclosure, senior officials of the 
major public agencies covered in the second round should discuss the findings.  A mini 
report was prepared for each agency, highlighting the key indicators of service quality, 
public satisfaction and other pertinent dimensions. Major service providers listened to the 
citizens' reactions, examined their organizations' performance, and considered ways to 
improve responsiveness.  More important, all the public agency heads involved in the 
report, without exception, commended the initiative and acknowledged the value of 
popular feedback. 
                                                 
5 Adapted from Samuel Paul, “Nudging the State to Act: What Report Cards Did in Bangalore”, 1999; see 
also Klitgaard, Mclean-Abaroa, and Parris, 2000; and Paul, 1995.    26
 
A new Chief Minister of Karnataka took office around the time the second report 
card was released.  He made a public commitment to improve state governance, and in 
particular to upgrade local infrastructure and services.  He established the Bangalore 
Agenda Task Force (BATF), consisting of prominent citizens, with a mission of getting 
industry and civil society more involved in the city’s rejuvenation. This was the first time 
that the state's chief executive had openly responded to demands of the citizens, the 
media, and public interest groups to increase city service providers' accountability.  A 
major public event—“The Bangalore Summit”—followed; in addition to pledges of 
improvement from the heads of public agencies, industrialists and businesspersons made 
public commitments of funds to improve or develop specific public activities or 
infrastructure. 
 
BATF has regularly met with all the service providers to track the progress of the 
program action plan.  The initiative has demonstrated some "quick wins", such as 
developing a system for the self-assessment of property taxes.  Rather than relying on tax 
collectors, who traditionally have levied property taxes arbitrarily and taken advantage of 
the citizenry, the new system has easy-to-follow, verifiable criteria that citizens can apply 
themselves.  Grievance procedures are also open and clearly defined.  Information has 
been disseminated through meetings in different parts of the city, held in cooperation 
with citizen groups and other NGOs.   
 
Controlling corruption and improving services at the local level are tasks on a 
different magnitude than those undertaken in Ghana. But the Bangalore case illustrates 
precisely the sort of reinforcing links between civil society and the political will of major 
leadership that coalitions may be best positioned to build. Another important factor was 
the way corruption, and responses to it, were incorporated into broader assessments of the 
efficiency and responsiveness of local agencies. In many instances, responsive leadership 
and a streamlined administrative process may be among the most effective anti-
corruption strategies available (Klitgaard et. al., 2000). Moreover, progress toward those 
goals may be both the best and most economical way to measure reform progress, 
particularly at the local level. As noted, agency heads welcomed citizen feedback and 
judgments on those issues, and support from the new Karnataka executive played a major 
role in the success of the project. These latter two sources of strength, reflections of 
India's surprisingly durable democracy, may not be available in all cases, but even where 
they are not, citizen input and agency responsiveness regarding technical, "non-political" 
issues can be a place to start. 
 
  BATF's growth is also built upon a diverse repertoire of incentives. The purposive 
incentives are clear, and in this instance the links between civil society and governmental 
leaders provide clear political incentives too. But it is also worth noting that BATF's 
broad base of support, and perceived effectiveness, help create solidary appeals: business, 
and leaders in both government and civil society, who support the coalition are affiliating 
themselves with a popular, prestigious body, and are in a position not only to back, but 
also to take partial credit for, anti-corruption successes and improvements in local 
services. Solidary incentives extend to ordinary citizens as well: taking part in   27
community meetings, and the possible feeling that one is doing something about local 
problems, can be a source of gratification and enjoyment—as can the sense that someone 
in local government cares enough to listen. Recognition from BATF for successful 
initiatives at both the governmental and community level is also valuable in itself.  
 
It is not clear at this point whether BATF has begun to develop material 
incentives to any significant degree (though improvements in governance and services, 
and reductions in the massive corruption levels alluded to above, certainly promise 
material gains in the long run). Unlike Ghana, where GACC's links to government 
leaders are in a sense both too extensive and too weak, it may be that BATF is too 
dependent upon committed and enlightened officials; if the day comes when it no longer 
enjoys support within state and city government, or its criticisms of corruption and poor 
services begin to arouse official antagonism, significant problems may result. These are 
additional reasons to augment the purposive and solidary appeals of the coalition with at 
least some limited material incentives—indeed, incentives for which BATF can take clear 
credit.  Still, Bangalore offers us an example of a coalition-building effort that has 
achieved visible success, enjoys broad-based support, and is able to link anti-corruption 
activities effectively with a drive for improved  government more generally. In that sense 
it is well into the Expansion phase of our developmental schema, at the very least, and 
has likely embarked upon Transformation. 
 
 
PART III: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE? 
 
I. Implications and Opportunities 
 
Our cases do not come close to exhausting the full range of coalition-building 
possibilities and challenges. But several key points from our discussion in Part I stand out 
as common elements. There are contrasts as well from that discussion; some of these 
point to questions for further analysis, and others to problems coalition partners must 
address.  
 
  Clearly the notion of working in a cooperative relationship with government 
enjoys wide acceptance. Not only have our coalitions (so far) avoided confrontations; in 
each case extensive coordination and information-sharing efforts are apparent. Sooner or 
later, however, all coalitions will have to address the question of detailed working 
relationships between the public and private sector. To what extent does official 
participation in anti-corruption activities create conflicts of interest, or threaten the 
necessary autonomy of both the officials and their agencies on the one hand, and of the 
coalition on the other? Does such participation create incentives and opportunities that 
serve neither officials nor the coalition well? For example, an official might use extensive 
coalition activity to distract attention from corrupt processes continuing within his or her 
agency, or might feel coalition activities threaten the confidentiality of proprietary data. 
Or—and perhaps more likely, based on the cases we have considered—official 
participation and government support of the coalition may well be pro forma only. The 
reluctance of the Ghanaian government to designate coalition participants on its side of   28
the table, as contrasted with the active support of important officials and agencies in 
Bangalore, is just one example. What will happen when difficult situations arise, be they 
in the form of public scandals that must be addressed, or of the appearance of greater 
corruption that may well accompany the early stages of serious reforms? Extensive 
cooperation will be essential, but will there be people, structures, and incentives 
sufficient to sustain it? 
 
More variation is apparent in the patterns of leadership, agenda-setting and 
implementation. In Ghana, initiative has come from above (a factor that doubtless has 
reinforced the strategy of collective ownership of the corruption issues, but is also raising 
problems of cooperation among elites); in Bangalore, it began with information-gathering 
at the grassroots. In Ghana the emphasis has been on collective ownership and action; 
Bangalore's case attests to what can be accomplished when citizen initiative is joined 
with, and shaped by, commitment leadership from above. Very likely this is a goal in 
both cases, but will have to be approached from quite different starting points. 
 
  Another common problem is the heavy reliance upon purposive incentives. Given 
the nature of reform, and in light of the need to raise the corruption issue both on the elite 
agenda and in the popular consciousness, this is hardly a surprising pattern. What is also 
apparent, however, is that relatively few other incentives are on offer. There are good 
reasons for this, particularly in the early stages: to the extent that material resources are 
scarce—and they are likely to be so in most high-corruption societies—early reliance 
upon purposive incentives (if only by default) is understandable. Collective and specific 
solidary incentives, by definition, require a working organization before they can be 
made available. But other kinds of incentives must be created and deployed as soon as 
possible, for several reasons. Purposive appeals are fragile—vulnerable not only to "free 
rider" problems, but also to changes in political and economic circumstances, public 
opinion, and policy agendas, and not by themselves a promising way to sustain a group. 
Specific solidary and exclusive material incentives are an important hedge against these 
kinds of risks. Relatively few of either have been deployed as yet, although the 
Governance Partnership, a recent coalition-building project in Indonesia, has been able to 
offer funding to local projects (an exclusive material incentive), as has Bulgaria's 
Coalition 2000. Obtaining such resources can be difficult, and doing so may compromise 
the coalition's integrity and independence; but any exclusive material incentives, even in 
very small amounts, would be of immense value both for building support and 
demonstrating credibility.  
 
In the long run, a truly independent coalition will need its own paid staff. 
Volunteers are unlikely to provide sustained effort and continuity; this is why George 
Washington Plunkitt, a colorful figure in Tammany Hall's very dirty New York City 
machine, likened reformers to "mornin' glories" that make a bright appearance but do not 
linger, and correctly observed that those whose livelihoods depend upon politics are the 
most reliable source of work and support (Riordon, 1963 ed.: 17-20). Reliance upon 
seconded government staff undermines autonomy and credibility, and may well leave the 
coalition dependent upon such information as officials choose to give them. Funding for 
staff may be obtainable from international partners for a time, but cannot and should not   29
become a permanent source. Businesses, large individual donors (a source that may pose 
its own risks), and to a much lesser extent, civil society groups are the likely targets for 
fundraising; and there, a variety of exclusive material and specific solidary incentives are 
likely to be required. The former need not be immensely expensive, but may still take 
considerable time and effort to assemble: "corruption insurance" schemes, data- and 
information banks, or similar arrangements for providing legal and technical advice can 
be of real value to business and NGO members but require staff, time, and expertise. 
Fortunately, specific solidary incentives are easier to obtain: various citations, awards and 
other kinds of recognition need cost little or nothing. They are a potentially effective way 
to build sustaining support, gather critical resources in the credibility and expansion 
phases, and publicize the coalition, its activities, and its benefactors. Such recognition can 
of course diminish in value if carried to excess, or if the coalition itself does not earn its 
own prestige and effectiveness. But particularly during the credibility and expansion 
phases, such incentives will be essential.  
 
If civil society is to become a full partner—always a long-term project, but 
essential to the transformation phase—purposive incentives will again be insufficient by 
themselves. Some exclusive material incentives may be available: ordinary citizens may 
value advice on how to avoid corruption, how to obtain various licenses and permits, or 
whom to approach with reports of abuses; but restricting most such benefits to members 
only will be self-defeating. Such restrictions will quickly create image problems, and 
while support at the grassroots level is critical actual membership is not likely to be 
common. Collective solidary appeals, however, can fill the gap. We have already 
mentioned sociability and fellowship: simply offering people (particularly the young) the 
opportunity to gather, have fun, and raise morale—always under the well-publicized 
aegis of the coalition, as Hong Kong's ICAC showed—can win favorable visibility in the 
eyes of citizens, the press, and elites. Bangalore used other collective solidary incentives: 
community meetings to discuss common problems, the opportunity to take part in "report 
card" projects, and the sense that the coalition is reaching out for one's opinions and 
personal knowledge (and takes them seriously) can be very valuable. Clearly these 
incentives are closely related to the purposive agenda; indeed, the more they overlap, the 
better in terms of the utility of purposive appeals. But particularly in the expansion and 
transformation phases, the rewards flowing from participation in coalition activities can 
cost very little, and yet link the coalition's purposive agenda to the day-to-day needs of 
citizens.  
 
A similar synergy between the purposive and the collective solidary—one that 
may be of particular value in the credibility phase—can be achieved through anti-
corruption pacts of many sorts. These could be among bidders on contracts large or small, 
or on privatizations. Or, small business owners and stallholders at local markets could 
agree that they will not make shakedown payments to police and inspectors, but will 
instead report all such demands to the coalition and to authorities. The coalition, for its 
part, can back up these pacts with offers of legal services and access to journalists—
again, clear evidence of credibility. In the long run, the ability to pay victims of such 
harassment even a small amount of compensation (or to obtain it from official sources) 
would give many people strong reasons to join and support the anti-corruption   30
movement. No doubt, such pacts can entail risk: the police may threaten violence, and 
inspectors can be counted on to issue numerous citations for violations that would 
otherwise escape the naked eye. But the strength that lies in numbers is both an asset in 
the pact-making process and a long-term goal in itself.  Making anti-corruption pacts 
public from the start, under the auspices of a credible and prestigious public-private 
coalition, increases the likelihood that government officials and third parties will take 
them seriously, and may help rein in the harassment of pact makers. Ministers and 
mayors whose subordinates are seen abusing the parties to a well-publicized non-
corruption pact can be subjected to many kinds of pressure.  
 
The prestige and credibility of the coalition itself are important parts of the 
incentive system.  Rewards and commendations will be worth even more, pacts will be 
taken more seriously, and opportunities for mass participation will be all the more 
attractive if the coalition is seen as honest, prestigious, and broad-based. For this reason 
the early agenda is critical. Hong Kong's repatriation and conviction of the corrupt police 
official provides a classic example; the "quick wins" attained by BATF in Bangalore—
winning the clear attention of agency heads, reforming the property-tax assessment 
process—are others. As noted above, early targets should not necessarily be the most 
serious corruption problems or the biggest fish. Early victories should be seen as ways of 
building credibility and prestige that can be parlayed into solidary incentives. 
 
Many of the observations offered here are familiar ones; what we offer is the 
notion of sustaining the activities of an anti-corruption coalition through a comprehensive 
and diverse repertoire of incentives, and of understanding its development not just in 
terms of adding size but rather as an evolutionary process involving qualitative change. 
Understanding the challenges this way not only can help reform leaders assess their 
progress in organization-building, and find ways to make the critical transition from 
launching a movement with a noble purpose to fielding a sustainable organization 
capable of effective action. It can also identify relatively easy-to-create rewards and 
appeals useful in winning over key constituencies, and suggest ways in which activities 
that might seem peripheral to the core mission may actually be important ways to sustain 
it.  At the same time, a significant danger, particularly in the expansion phase, is "goal 
displacement"—that is, confusing means with ends. Many an organization loses its way 
as fundraising in particular, as well as other maintenance activities, come to dominate the 
agenda and drive broader goals off it. By emphasizing the different structures, challenges, 
and activities that mark the later stages of development, we hope we have identified ways 
of avoiding this problem. Fundamentally, however, it will always be important to retain 
the focus on the coalition as part of a broader push toward better governance, social and 




Coalition building to fight corruption is more of a metaphor than a blueprint: effective 
social action coalitions will differ considerably in organization, tactics, and agendas from 
one society to the next. The key to the strategy is a mix of continuity and adaptation. The 
former depends upon a solid internal economy of incentives, while the latter requires   31
leadership aware of the broader need for political will and a strong civil society, of the 
role a social action coalition can play in linking and supporting them, and of the 
transitions and changes that will affect the movement in the course of its long-term 
development. International partners can contribute in many ways: continuity can be 
enhanced, without excessive outside interference or an overly close public linkage 
between the coalition and "outsiders", by sharing expertise and information, particularly 
with similar anti-corruption movements in other societies. Training is also an important 
form of aid; over the medium to long term, however, international backers will need to 
shift the emphasis from training by outsiders to helping various anti-corruption coalitions 
train each other.  Judicious application of funding—not only for permanent staff in the 
early phases, but also for publicity, and for small grants that can be converted into 
exclusive material incentives at the discretion of local coalition leadership—can pay 
long-term dividends far exceeding the sums contributed. 
 
  A less cheerful role for international partners—but one that will undoubtedly 
arise—is as a "guarantor" in case of disaster. A transition from a friendly to a hostile 
regime, a rise of repression, or significant social dislocations may compel a coalition to 
suspend or sharply curtail its activities for a time. At such points it is important that 
knowledge, records, and "institutional memory" not be lost, and that the anti-corruption 
story and the coalition's image not be forfeited to hostile interests or to fate. International 
partners can help maintain external sets of archives and an independent communications 
network—via websites, email and fax networks, by keeping archives (and people?) in a 
safe place—making it much easier for activities to resume once a crisis has passed.  
 
Even with all of those factors in place, success is far from a certainty, and there 
will be many setbacks along the way. Still, we have tried to show that even where 
corruption is entrenched and reformers lack critical resources it is possible to build a base 
for effective action. Perhaps the most important thing to remember is that coalitions are 
merely means toward broader ends. They are not, in themselves, the solution to the 
problem, but rather a framework encouraging leaders and citizens to oppose corruption 
because it is in their best interests to do so. They also lay the groundwork for better 
governance, and a stronger civil society—in effect, diffusing political will throughout 
society rather than depending upon individual political leaders only. To the extent that 
they succeed at this, they will be following the path taken by other societies that have, 
through contention and over time, brought corruption under control—because it has been 
worthwhile for people to do so.   32
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